

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDO/PV.390
15 August 1968
ENGLISH

STATE OF MICHIGAN

NOV 20 1968

DOCUMENT
COLLECTION

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND NINETIETH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 15 August 1968, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. H. KHALLAF (United Arab Republic)

GE.68-15244
68-18952

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. da COSTA GUIMARAES
Mr. L.F. PALMEIRA LAMPREIA
Mr. J. NOGUEIRA FILHO

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. CHRISTOV
Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV

Burma:

U KYAW MIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. J.R. MORDEN

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. T. LAHODA
Mr. R. KLEIN
Mr. J. STRUCKA

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ZELLEKE
Mr. G. ALULA

India:

Mr. M.A. HUSAIN
Mr. K.P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI
Mr. R. BERLENGHI

Mexico:

Mr. H. CARDENAS RODRIGUEZ

Nigeria:

Alhaji SULE KOLO
Mr. L.A. MALIKI

Poland:

Mr. H. JAROSZEK
Mr. K. ZYBYLSKI
Mr. H. STEPOSZ

Romania:

Mr. N. ECOBESCO
Mr. O. IONESCO
Mr. V. TARZIORU
Mr. C. MITRAN

Sweden:

Mr. A. EDELSTAM
Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. R.M. TIMERBAEV
Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV
Mr. M.P. SHELEPIN

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALLAF
Mr. O. SIRRY
Mr. M. SHAKER

United Kingdom:

Mr. W.N. HILLIER-FRY
Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE

United States of America:

Mr. G. BUNN
Mr. C. GLEYSTEEN
Mr. C.G. BREAM

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (United Arab Republic): I declare open the 390th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

2. Mr. JAROSZEK (Poland): Let me begin by stating that my delegation notes with satisfaction the large number of interesting proposals and suggestions concerning both the substance and the procedure of our work which have been put before the Committee in the course of this session. They all deserve careful and serious consideration. I think that they create a good basis for further fruitful work in the Committee.

3. Among the different suggestions and proposals advanced in the interventions we have heard so far, there seems to be one element in particular on which the attention of the Committee is focused, namely the problem of nuclear disarmament — which indeed is of primary importance to all of us. I believe that this is not a mere coincidence but the expression of a sincere approach to the most urgent problem of our time — the danger resulting from the continuation of the nuclear arms race. There seems to be general appreciation of the fact that the question of nuclear disarmament is the key to a positive solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament. This is, I think, the very foundation of all our negotiations on disarmament. The solution of this problem would mean, generally speaking, the banning of the use of nuclear weapons, the prohibition of their production and the liquidation of their stockpiles.

4. Nuclear disarmament is undoubtedly of the greatest importance to every country represented in this Committee, as it is, indeed, to every country in the world. Poland, the very biological existence of which was threatened during the last war and which after the war had to mobilize the energies of each and every one of its citizens for the vital task of rebuilding the country, condemned by the Nazis to total destruction, is vitally interested in the achievement of this goal. We realize, of course, that its eventual achievement will come about through the adoption of a series of partial measures rather than through the conclusion of one all-embracing agreement, much as the latter is desired. That is why the Polish delegation believes that our most immediate task should be to secure conditions in which no controversial international situation, no matter how serious it might be, could develop into a nuclear holocaust.

(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

5. According to document ENDC/1/Add.1 the Committee should consider also partial measures which could lead to the lessening of international tension and to the reduction of mistrust among States, and which consequently would facilitate the achievement of general and complete disarmament. The realistic approach of seeking partial solutions where it is much easier to overcome political and technical difficulties has brought about a number of positive solutions whose impact upon the slowing-down of the nuclear arms race should not be underestimated. I have in mind the 1963 Moscow partial test-ban treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1), the 1967 Treaty on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI), Annex), and, most recently, the non-proliferation treaty (General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), Annex) (ENDC/226). All those measures, while not solving the general problem of nuclear disarmament, have played an important role by creating the necessary conditions for further steps in that direction.

6. In its discussion of steps leading to nuclear disarmament our Committee should, in my opinion, devote particular attention to the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The concept of banning the use of nuclear weapons is not a new one. It came to light as a result of the general reaction of public opinion to the dropping of the first atomic bomb, on Hiroshima some twenty-three years ago. The use of atomic weapons was condemned by the most enlightened representatives of mankind, following the initiative of international progressive forces whose fervent call, contained in the universally-known Stockholm Appeal, was a landmark in this campaign.

7. The United Nations responded to that human appeal. On the initiative of Ethiopia the General Assembly adopted on 24 November 1961 the Declaration concerning the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons (General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI)). At that time the desirability of concluding a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons was justified, to use the terms of the Declaration, by the unsatisfactory progress made in the field of disarmament and by the fact that the nuclear arms race had achieved "a ... stage requiring all possible precautionary measures to protect humanity and civilization from the hazard of nuclear and thermo-nuclear catastrophe". That warning, as well as the legal and moral qualifications of the use of nuclear weapons, contained in the above-mentioned Declaration is still valid. Let me recall here that the Declaration condemned the use of nuclear weapons as contrary to the spirit, letter and aims of the United Nations Charter, contrary to the principles of international law, and a crime against humanity.

(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

8. Following the recommendation embodied in General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI), in January 1962 the Secretary-General invited the Governments of the States Members of the United Nations to submit their comments and views concerning the desirability of convening an international conference on the question of banning the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. In his report on 30 August 1962 (A/5174) the Secretary-General concluded that the answers received from governments confirmed their determination to continue efforts in a search for ways and means, acceptable to all interested parties, which would eliminate the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.

9. Following the initiative of Ethiopia and the Declaration of 24 November 1961, the Government of the Soviet Union proposed at the twenty-second session of the General Assembly the convening of a conference in order to conclude an international convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The draft convention submitted by the Government of the Soviet Union provided in article 1 that --

"Each Party to this convention gives the solemn undertaking to refrain from using nuclear weapons, from threatening to use them and from inciting other States to use them." (A/6834, p.3)

10. The General Assembly adopted on 8 December 1967 without a single negative vote resolution 2289 (XXII) (ENDC/210), which underlined the importance of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and requested the Secretary-General to transmit the draft convention on the prohibition of the use of such weapons to all States Members of the United Nations and to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament for their consideration.

11. The Polish delegation, having in mind both the discussion concerning the problem of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons held so far and the requirements of the international situation, is of the view that the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons could be another important link in the chain of measures aiming at the cessation of the nuclear arms race. We know, of course, that such a prohibition would not solve all the military and political problems we are confronted with as a result of the nuclear arms race. We are realists. But it is precisely that sense of realism that compels us to search for any hopeful solution, even if only of a partial nature, and to explore any possibility of progress on the road to the cessation of the nuclear arms race, with a view to consolidating what has already been achieved in this field and also to establishing a more sound starting-point for further measures leading to that goal.

(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

12. That is why we consider as hazardous the view that, as long as no substantial progress has been made in the solution of the basic problem of nuclear disarmament, States should be allowed to feel completely free to pursue their activities in the field of nuclear armament. We remember that similar views were advanced in this Committee a few years ago, when we began to tackle the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, the non-proliferation treaty has been successfully concluded and, as is now generally recognized, it opens the way for further steps in the direction of nuclear disarmament.

13. We think that, while recognizing the importance of measures which could bring direct material results in the field of nuclear disarmament, the value of various measures of a legal and a political character should not be underestimated. The majority of agreements achieved so far, which are rightly interpreted as measures slowing down the nuclear arms race, prohibit certain forms of activities of States in the field of atomic weapons. Those agreements establish a certain "objective legal régime" corresponding to the individual and collective interests of States. By strengthening the legal structure of the international community they create favourable conditions for further steps of both a political and a legal character.

14. This trend has been noticeable in the development of the international community beginning with the first international instruments establishing certain principles of conducting wars, which paved the way for further measures in this field. Thus, for example, the adoption of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 was preceded by the prohibition of the use of asphyxiating weapons. Today some representatives in this Committee call for a "modernization" of the Geneva Protocol; although in my opinion our first preoccupation should be rather with the full and universal observance of that Protocol. In any case, without going into the substance of the proposed convention for the prohibition of microbiological methods of warfare, it is relevant to note that some of the arguments advanced in its favour are just as valid for a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

15. The Polish delegation firmly believes that, if adopted, a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons not only would complement the already-established limitations in the field of nuclear armament but would become an important instrument strengthening the international legal order. It would enhance the effectiveness of the international legal obligations concerning the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

It would play an important role in invigorating the sense of security among States and thus help to eliminate from international relations the possibilities of "atomic blackmail diplomacy". It would increase the efficiency of various institutions of international law, such as the right of States to existence, the right to self-defence and the right to neutrality in time of peace as well as in time of war. Finally, it would facilitate broader solutions in respect of nuclear disarmament by creating conditions leading to the lessening of international tension.

16. We also think that one should not depreciate in advance the possible positive effects of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons in case of an armed conflict. Such a prohibition would undoubtedly narrow the possibilities of turning a conventional armed conflict into a nuclear war. I do not consider it useful to dwell now on the hypothetical question whether in case of an armed conflict it would be possible to observe fully and universally the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. On the contrary, I think that if we were to take as a starting-point the inevitability of violation of the rules of law which we were about to establish, we would be undermining the very foundation of law and order in international relations. What then would be the use of negotiations at all? History demonstrates that there have indeed been violations of international law. The same can be said about legal order within individual countries. But there is an overwhelming number of examples of the observance of established principles and rules of law. Such principles and rules are and should continue to be formulated whenever the need and possibility arise. Let us then be optimistic - realistically optimistic.

17. I am confident that the adoption of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would be a propulsive force for other measures conducive to the slowing-down of the nuclear arms race and to the prohibition of production, reduction of stockpiles and eventual total elimination of nuclear weapons. While fully supporting the arguments advanced by a number of delegations for a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, I should like to stress that all countries of the world, large and small alike, have everything to lose and nothing to gain in the nuclear arms race. We all have everything to gain and nothing to lose in preventing the use of nuclear weapons. I am convinced that the peoples of all countries of the world, just like the people of Poland, will welcome most warmly the adoption of such a convention.

18. In conclusion, the Polish delegation wishes to put on record its view that the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons should be given a very high priority in the programme of work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

19. The CHAIRMAN (United Arab Republic): With the permission of the Committee I shall now make a statement on behalf of the delegation of the United Arab Republic.

20. It is with a feeling of great satisfaction and well-deserved pride that our Committee can look back on the years of efforts spent towards the successful conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This major achievement, which is expected to end once and for all the spread of nuclear weapons to further countries, is generally and quite rightly considered as a serious step taking us nearer towards halting the nuclear arms race and bringing about nuclear disarmament.

21. The favourable international climate that this treaty has thus done much to bring about is further accentuated by some recent developments: for example, the bilateral talks which, it is hoped, will soon be held between the Soviet Union and the United States on the limitation and subsequent reduction of strategic delivery systems, both offensive and defensive. The United Arab Republic welcomes these talks and wishes them well. We are aware of the special character of such negotiations as well as of their delicate and sensitive nature; and we therefore associate ourselves with those delegations which already have approved of their being conducted directly between the States most concerned.

22. At the same time, we share the view that it is appropriate that our Committee be kept informed of the developments in those talks; as this not only would enlighten us on a particularly important aspect of disarmament, but would also assist our endeavours to reach agreement on other, related matters, such as a comprehensive test-ban treaty and -- why not? -- complete nuclear disarmament. As my delegation sees it, there is merit in the view that progress on limiting strategic delivery systems will tend to facilitate our work on other measures of nuclear disarmament, just as any agreement arrived at here regarding such related measures will, in turn, have a positive impact on these bilateral talks too.

23. Unfortunately, the current international atmosphere does not consist of auspicious elements alone. Quite far from it. Many threatening forces are endangering peace, as was rightly pointed out by the representatives of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and Poland. Above all, there is the inflammable situation in the Middle East created by the Israeli aggression against Arab countries and the continued occupation of Arab territories, perpetuated by the refusal of Israel to accept and implement the resolutions

(The Chairman, United Arab Republic)

unanimously adopted by various United Nations organs. Such an alarming situation, fraught with immense danger, cannot be allowed to drift, and an end must be put to aggression. Only a climate void of international tension can be conducive to the successful outcome of our negotiations here.

24. As far as the United Arab Republic is concerned, it will continue as before to work hard for peace. It was in that spirit that we were one of the co-sponsors of the draft treaty on non-proliferation during the resumed session of the General Assembly. It was in that spirit too that we were among the first to sign, without hesitation. We shall keep on making every conceivable effort to assist the process of universal disarmament --- especially in this Committee, which we consider to be the most suitable international forum for discussing and elaborating ways and means to that end.

25. If we find great encouragement in the successful conclusion of the non-proliferation treaty to push ahead with our endeavours, we must nevertheless be aware of the particular difficulties with which we shall be confronted during the next stages of our work. In fact, during the past two years our efforts were directed mainly at preventing a perilous situation from becoming worse. In a sense this was a measure of containment, a preventive measure only; but now we must try to remove the existing peril itself by asking for a halt in the nuclear arms race and subsequently a reduction of nuclear stockpiles with a view to eliminating them altogether. That is a far more difficult task, which necessitates close co-operation between all States, large and small, lest the security, if not the very existence, of each of them be threatened. Yet, although all of us will have to share in the future work for disarmament, it must be realized that henceforth the main moral responsibility for achieving that end lies with the nuclear-weapon Powers. Therefore the success of our efforts will depend to a large extent on their political will, their foresight, and the way their national interests are reconciled with those of mankind as a whole.

26. How are we to proceed? Some delegations have expressed their willingness to discuss a number of items which they have thought it important to raise in our Committee at this juncture. The Soviet memorandum (ENDC/227) and the message of President Johnson to this Committee (ENDC/228) set out the respective positions of the USSR and the United States. Other delegations have spoken in favour of giving certain priorities to various items of disarmament. My delegation, for its part, shares the view that, while in

(The Chairman, United Arab Republic)

principle complete freedom should be given to participants to raise any disarmament issue which they may deem useful and in the general interest, a flexible agenda setting out some priorities is a necessary precondition of orderly, accelerated and successful work -- which should not, however, be confined, as in the recent past, to one subject only.

27. In our view, the attention of this Committee should not be diverted unduly to problems which, although of great importance, when compared to others seem less ripe and of a less urgent nature, while leaving unconsidered and in abeyance issues which present a more imminent and acute danger to mankind. Moreover, my delegation doubts the wisdom of sidetracking the consideration of urgent measures such as a comprehensive test ban while awaiting the results of the bilateral talks on strategic delivery systems, for instance. As we see it, there would be no difficulty of a practical nature in proceeding with parallel discussions in the Committee and in the capitals of the two super-Powers on different though related issues.

28. Before dealing with the agenda of our work, I should like to invite the Committee to be vigilant as regards the future of the non-proliferation treaty. As a matter of fact, earlier this year when the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament forwarded to the General Assembly its report (ENDC/225) on a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, it did more than just submit the fruit of long and protracted negotiations for the United Nations to consider and approve. In fact it convinced a relieved world that multilateral agreements on measures pertaining to nuclear disarmament could be worked out successfully if only the collective political will to do so prevailed, especially among the nuclear States of the world.

29. Today the seventy or more signatures to the non-proliferation treaty are clear testimony to the aspirations of those countries to put an end to the fear of an inevitable nuclear holocaust which has been and still is plaguing mankind. At the same time, one can hardly overlook the fact that such hopes will remain somewhat dim while the treaty still awaits signature by a preponderance of States the nuclear potentialities of many of which make it most desirable that they too identify themselves without undue delay with its aims and purposes. As my delegation sees it, a particular cause for alarm lies in the fact that hidden among these are certain countries which in fact have achieved notoriety for their wilful non-conformity with the principles of the Charter and their disrespect of United Nations resolutions.

(The Chairman, United Arab Republic)

30. I feel it advisable, therefore, that this Committee continue to keep a watchful eye on the evolution towards full and universal implementation of the treaty. The representatives of the depositary Governments should give us from time to time an overall picture of the position concerning signatures, the deposit of instruments of ratification or accession, and the date of entry into force of the treaty. Furthermore, we believe it to be the duty of this Committee to protect the treaty against all attempts at harming it; and this could best be done by not removing it from the Committee's agenda.

31. Moreover, some attention must be devoted to the implementation of article V of this treaty, which we still believe should be entrusted to the International Atomic Energy Agency. Indeed, commenting on the revised draft of the non-proliferation treaty (ENDC/192/Rev.1 and 193/Rev.1), I stressed on 20 February of this year that --

"We still believe that the task of controlling all activities in this field should be entrusted ... to an appropriate international body, and that the IAEA would be best suited for this task. We consider it important to affirm this principle in the text of article V." (ENDC/PV.367, para.32)

The position of the United Arab Republic on this point remains unchanged; and we are happy to note that this view is now being adhered to by other States as well. My delegation therefore supports the suggestion made by the representative of the United Kingdom (ENDC/PV.381, para. 81) to request the IAEA to study and in due course to report to the Committee on the part it might play in implementing article V.

32. Coming back to the agenda, we believe that it must comprise those items which the General Assembly transmitted to our Committee for consideration and action. These, as well as other items, could be gathered under one main heading: namely, effective measures on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament. This heading, which in the view of my delegation should receive absolute priority, would comprise several sub-items: (a) those endorsed by the General Assembly by special resolutions, such as the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, and the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests; and (b) others such as the cut-off of production of fissile material for weapons purposes and the reduction and destruction of stockpiles.

33. In addition there are some other topics of importance -- although perhaps of a less urgent character -- which could be discussed under a lesser priority, as for instance the prohibition of the use of the sea-bed for military purposes, and the prohibition of the use of bacteriological and chemical weapons in war.

(The Chairman, United Arab Republic)

34. It may be argued that this is too ambitious a list of items to be fruitfully discussed in the Committee. We do not share that view. On the contrary, we believe that it is well within our means to come to grips with all those issues. Of course, we realize that certain items have matured more during our previous discussions than others. These should receive a preferential treatment. Thus we consider the comprehensive test-ban treaty to hold a very special place, and I need not elaborate on the reasons for this, as almost every representative who has spoken before me has done so with great ability.

35. We have followed with particular interest the statements made by the representatives of Sweden (ENDC/PV.385), the United Kingdom (ENDC/PV.381, paras. 74 et seq.) and Canada (ENDC/PV.389) concerning the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty at the earliest possible moment, as well as the suggestions formulated in that respect. We are indebted to the Swedish and Canadian delegations for the valuable information they gave us on recent developments in their countries in seismological research relating to the test ban. We are grateful, furthermore, for the circulation of the summary report (ENDC/230) prepared in Stockholm by scientists coming from many countries, for the purpose of elaborating technical means which would make it possible further to narrow the gap between identifiable and unidentifiable events. That meeting, in a sense, complements the endeavours of the "detection club" for international co-operation in the exchange of seismic data, in which the United Arab Republic is participating.

36. Indeed, we share with the Swedish delegation a belief in the utility of such meetings and in the inevitably fruitful exchange of views, information and data. In her statement of 30 July, while commenting on some remarks made by the representative of Czechoslovakia, the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, said:

"It is not possible to obtain an unequivocal interpretation of seismic records so as to determine the yield of an explosion. One reason -- as indicated in the summary report of the recent meeting of seismological experts -- is that the conditions of the ground in which an explosion takes place can affect the observed magnitude by more than one unit on the seismic scale. The conclusion is unavoidable, although regrettable, that it is not feasible to control a ban on test explosions above a prescribed threshold through verification by seismological methods." (ENDC/PV.385, para.23)

(The Chairman, United Arab Republic)

That comment of a technical nature will be most carefully studied by my delegation. Pending this, we hope that the application of other methods like the ones considered by the scientists of the International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research (SIPRI) will not give rise to similar or different kinds of difficulties and uncertainties.

37. The recent developments in seismological research should have their positive reflection in our negotiations here. Indeed, we look forward to seeing them applied in practice. At any rate, if one admits as a reality of science that seismic events are currently divided into two categories -- those that can be identified and those that so far defy identification --, we shall have to decide whether it is advisable or not to submit these two categories to one and the same treatment. Would it not be wiser perhaps to find a suitable solution for each of the two categories separately?

Mrs. Myrdal seems to give preference to the former view. In fact in her suggestions (ENDC/PV.385, paras. 24 et seq.) concerning the draft treaty for a comprehensive test ban she proposes the insertion of an article prohibiting all tests without distinction. In case of contest recourse may be had to verification-by-challenge and an invitation to inspect.

38. As for the UAR suggestion put forward in 1965 (ENDC/PV.224, pages 9 et seq.), and supplemented in 1966 in the light of a Swedish proposal (ENDC/PV.247, 256), it was meant to separate the identifiable events, which are to be prohibited, from those which are not identifiable and which will be covered by a moratorium and recourse to identification-by-challenge. We believe such a difference of treatment to be not only logical but also expedient. The technical criteria as to which event is identifiable and which is not could, we trust, easily be agreed upon once the logic I have just outlined was found acceptable; especially as we are hopeful that the idea of a moratorium may now meet with more enthusiasm and mutual confidence than before.

39. The suggestion of the representative of the United Kingdom (ENDC/PV.381, paras. 76 et seq.) concerning the reaching of an agreement on a comprehensive test ban based on a decreasing quota of underground nuclear tests, coupled with the setting-up of an international commission to verify proper implementation, is under careful study by my delegation. Yet in a preliminary way we wonder whether it is not possible to avoid the many difficulties which will probably arise when planning for such a decreasing quota over a period of five years, and that by a judicious choice of the date of entry into force of a comprehensive test-ban treaty based on our suggestions.

(The Chairman, United Arab Republic)

40. Turning now to the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, we believe that that measure, too, should receive our urgent attention. We have always upheld that principle. We are in favour of concluding a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, provided it is adhered to and backed by the nuclear Powers. That is why I find great difficulty in sharing the doubts expressed here on the advisability of concluding such a convention.

41. In the first place I must say that the General Assembly, in an historic resolution known to all of us (1653 (XVI)), adopted a set of principles considering that any use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons violated the Charter of the United Nations, the rules of international law, and the laws of humanity.

42. Secondly, we fail to understand the view of those who maintain that one kind of weapon of mass destruction -- in this case the chemical and microbiological weapon -- can be successfully banned while at the same time they cast doubts on the possibility of banning another such weapon, namely the nuclear weapon.

43. Thirdly, we believe that the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would lead to further measures of nuclear disarmament, in the same way as we consider the non-proliferation treaty to be an important step towards that same end.

44. In conclusion, I wish to comment very briefly on some measures which have been referred to in this Committee, while reserving the right of my delegation to elaborate on them at a later date. Regarding the use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, my delegation shares the view that that environment should be used solely for peaceful purposes. Concerning the issue of chemical and biological weapons, the Committee is undoubtedly aware that since 1928 my country has been a signatory of the Geneva Protocol prohibiting their use.

45. To the mind of my delegation it is obvious that much thought and effort must be devoted to the proper preparation of this item; and it would be less than equitable if we were to give our views thereon after only a cursory study. At the same time my delegation is giving favourable consideration to the suggestion that this Committee should request the Secretary-General to prepare a report on this important matter.

46. Mr. CHRISTOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): In my statement on 23 July I stressed the great importance of the problem of banning the use of nuclear weapons and of the need to conclude a convention to that effect (ENDC/PV.383, para.31). I referred at the same time to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 as an international instrument prohibiting the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. We have therefore

(Mr. Christov, Bulgaria)

followed with the greatest interest and studied with the greatest care the statements made in that regard during previous meetings. Since in our view these problems are among those deserving the special attention of the Committee, I should like to take them up again in more detail. Before dealing with them, however, I beg to recall certain general considerations regarding the character and the nature of nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons, which are now customarily grouped under the heading "weapons of mass destruction". Within the discussion of these problems and in the light of what has been said here, and taking into account above all certain remarks concerning chemical and bacteriological weapons, such an approach seems to me to be not only timely but necessary.

47. The problem of weapons of mass destruction --- one of the most alarming of problems --- has been the subject of an impressive number of studies. Some of the most eminent and authoritative scientists, jurists and politicians have thoroughly analysed it in all its aspects --- historical, political, economic and military. Summing up, one may say that those studies have resulted in an unreserved condemnation of the very idea of a possible recourse to that type of weapon in a future war.

48. Whatever definition we may wish to adopt in this case, and whether the weapons be nuclear, chemical or bacteriological, one point remains clear: these are blind weapons of indiscriminate destruction and annihilation, no longer designed to destroy a given military objective but to bring devastation and death over a limitless area, and their use transforms war into a massacre of civilian populations. They are weapons which, because of their enormous destructive capacity, wipe out any difference between armed forces and civilian populations and condemn every living thing --- man, animal, vegetable --- without discrimination to the same deadly result.

49. The means that may be used to destroy human life have so benefited --- if one may put it that way --- from scientific and technical progress that the nuclear, bacteriological and chemical weapons existing today can destroy all traces of life over enormous areas and can cause instantaneous death or serious injuries that condemn living creatures to many years of indescribable suffering. We are familiar with the tragedy of those persons who survived the immediate effects of the gases used during the First World War. Today, twenty-three years after the first atomic bombardment, that of Hiroshima, people are suffering and dying from the effects of nuclear poison.

(Mr. Christov, Bulgaria)

50. This horrible, uncontrollable power of weapons of mass destruction has constantly mobilized the efforts and will of men living in civilized societies to prohibit their use as a means of waging war. Thus the use of weapons of mass destruction, causing useless human suffering, has in the past been prohibited as contrary to the laws of humanity and to the principles of international law by a whole series of international declarations and binding agreements. Later, in consequence of the use of chemical weapons during the First World War, some of these instruments of international law were taken up again by the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the prohibition of the use in war of "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices". This prohibition was also directed against the use of bacteriological methods of warfare.

51. The Geneva Protocol thus represents the codification of the rules of war, of international customs, of the obligations assumed by virtue of international instruments, and of the general principles of the law of warfare. The opinion of jurists in this respect is absolutely clear. A document of the International Conference on Human Rights, organized by the United Nations at Teheran from 21 April to 13 May of this year, defines the law of warfare as follows:

"The law of warfare is at present stated in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and in the revised text of 1907, in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 ..."

The same conference of jurists adopted a resolution containing, amongst others, the following proposal:

"Calls on all States which have not yet done so to become parties to the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (A/CONF.32/34, p.57) ..."

52. Hence we cannot agree with those who seek to underestimate the importance of the Geneva Protocol as an instrument of international law. We are convinced that, as such, it proved its value during the Second World War by preventing a fresh recourse to chemical and bacteriological warfare. It would be unfair to forget that only by referring to the Geneva Protocol has it been possible to issue warnings against the use of such weapons. Thus, for instance, the President of the United States emphasized in 1943 that the use of those weapons "... has been outlawed by the general opinion of civilized mankind ..."

(Mr. Christov, Bulgaria)

53. There are some interpretations and commentaries which tend to assert that the Geneva Protocol applied only to certain gases. I venture to say that those commentaries appear to us to be not at all in conformity with the spirit and the letter of the Geneva Protocol, which is explicit in this respect. It relates, as is said in the text, to "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and ... all analogous liquids, materials or devices".

54. In that connexion I should like to recall that more than forty-five years ago a committee was instructed by the League of Nations to draft a report on the threat which the use of chemical methods would constitute in a future war. The basic idea was to arouse, through a better knowledge of the dangers inherent in chemical warfare, a reaction in public opinion likely to prevent the use of those weapons. Some members of that committee -- which was composed of the foremost chemists of the time, including Professor Meyer -- referring to the great dangers of chemical warfare, made no distinction between lethal and non-lethal gases. According to Professor Meyer, the latter become equally lethal when used in massive quantities. As considerable progress has been made by chemical and bacteriological science since that time, it would be very useful to make a detailed study which would give a better idea of the risks which would accompany a war in which weapons of mass destruction of chemical and bacteriological origin were used.

55. My delegation therefore supports the suggestion made by the representative of Poland during the meeting on 30 July last (ENDC/PV.385, para. 70) that the Secretariat should prepare a report on the effects of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

56. I should now like to make another comment, in relation to the proposals put forward by the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Mulley. We understand the sentiments that prompted the representative of the United Kingdom when he spoke to us about the need to contribute to world security and to our peace of mind by creating conditions in which it would be beyond contemplation that micro-biological means should be used to wage war (ENDC/PV.387, para. 17). But we have not been persuaded of the need to set about drafting a new convention concerning

(Mr. Christov, Bulgaria)

microbiological weapons, since there exists an international instrument - the Geneva Protocol -- which proclaims the prohibition of the use of bacteriological weapons for the same reason as the use of chemical weapons. We do not believe that it would be useful to assail the Geneva Protocol -- which quite obviously would be the effect -- just when we are seeking to strengthen it by the accession of countries which have not yet acceded to it.

57. My delegation considers that we must do everything within our power to ensure the accession of all States to the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 in conformity with the resolution of the United Nations (2162 B (XXI); ENDC/185).

58. During the discussion in the League of Nations of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons, the rapporteur of the special committee entrusted with the study of the problem stated that the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons would give a future war a particularly inhuman character which could carry the dangers of war to an extreme limit, even to the point of transforming it into a threat to the very existence of humanity and of civilization.

59. That was in 1923, but we seem to be hearing the voices of some amongst us expressing in the same terms the same fears and anxieties for the fate of humanity and of civilization, threatened by weapons of mass destruction. I must add that there is one difference: the delegates conferring in the League of Nations could not suspect that we should be faced very soon with a new weapon of mass destruction, the most terrible of all: the nuclear weapon. The Geneva Protocol was adopted in 1925, when the nuclear weapon did not exist in the arsenal of terror. Now the cardinal problem of the prohibition of the use of weapons of mass destruction has acquired another dimension and demands a solution which, if it is to be adequate, can only be a ban on the use of nuclear weapons through the conclusion of an appropriate convention.

60. This necessity of our times is highlighted in the most pertinent manner in the Declaration adopted under United Nations General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI). That Declaration recalls that the use of weapons of mass destruction is prohibited as being contrary to the laws of humanity and to the principles of international law. It stresses that account must be taken of the fact that the use of nuclear weapons

(Mr. Christov, Bulgaria)

would result in much greater suffering for mankind and destruction to civilization than that caused by the weapons whose use has been declared contrary to the laws of humanity and a crime under international law.

61. Once again the similarity between the words I have just cited and those used by the League of Nations in discussing the danger of chemical and bacteriological warfare will certainly be noted. This is not surprising because, though the danger has changed its name as a result of the progress of science, its nature is the same: it is still the threat presented by weapons of mass destruction; and also because there is no alternative to seeking at the same level a measure similar to that adopted forty-five years ago: the prohibition of nuclear weapons as contrary to the laws of humanity.

62. This solution is imperative because, as we can never say too often, the nuclear weapon is not like the others. With its terrible destructive, explosive and incendiary power it combines many harmful effects which may be said to give it also certain characteristics of weapons of chemical and biological origin. The nuclear weapon, when it explodes, sets free toxic gases and in that way acts as a chemical weapon. The nuclear weapon affects living organisms either directly, or indirectly through the deterioration of the biological environment, particularly through contaminated food. In this way it assumes the hardly deniable character of a biological weapon.

63. The Bulgarian delegation, at all stages of the discussion of this problem, has always been in favour of this necessary and feasible solution and has insisted on the urgency of reaching a decision on it. That was the reason why the Bulgarian Government gave a favourable reply on 5 March 1962 to the Secretary-General's letter on the convening of a conference for signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, and suggested that the conference be convened as soon as possible.

64. We certainly do not assert -- indeed nobody asserts -- that a convention banning the use of nuclear weapons would of itself be a measure likely to eliminate the threat of a nuclear war or to solve the problems of nuclear disarmament or of general and complete disarmament. In our view it is a measure similar to several other partial measures discussed in the Committee. Decisions have been taken on

(Mr. Christov, Bulgaria)

some of those measures, and we hope they will be followed by others whose contribution to a relaxation of tension, the strengthening of confidence and the creation of a better international atmosphere has been admitted by everybody with the greatest satisfaction and with the hope that the situation thus created will make possible further progress on the road to disarmament.

65. The conclusion of a convention banning the use of nuclear weapons would have immense political significance and a favourable effect on relations between States, the cessation of the armaments race and the negotiations on the whole series of disarmament problems. The prohibition of nuclear weapons would have particular significance for the non-nuclear countries, which make up the great majority of the Member countries of the United Nations. The process of denuclearization, in which many States are already firmly engaged and which has attained its highest expression in the signing of the non-proliferation treaty (ENDC/226*), would be accelerated.

66. The favourable effect which the signature of such a convention would have on world public opinion is reflected in the support which the great majority of the Member countries of the world organization gave to the proposal made at the last session of the General Assembly by the Soviet delegation. In the vote on resolution 2289 (XXII) (ENDC/210), expressing the conviction that it is essential to continue urgently the examination of the question, 77 countries voted in favour and 29 abstained, while not one country voted against. It is also interesting to see how the attitude adopted by the international community towards this question has developed. In the vote on the above-mentioned Declaration which was the subject of resolution 1653 (XVI) of 1961, 55 countries voted in favour, 20 voted against and 27 abstained. In 1963, resolution 1909 (XVIII) (ENDC/116), in which the United Nations recalled that the problem could be speedily and effectively studied, received 64 votes in favour, while there were 18 votes against and 25 abstentions. There is no doubt that this development, in which the ranks of the majority have increased while those of the open adversaries have decreased to the vanishing-point, testifies that the world has not yet lost all its faith in reason and international law.

67. I should like to take up two points in the above-mentioned resolution which seem to me to be worth remembering: (1) the problem can be studied speedily and effectively, and (2) the question of the conclusion of a convention can be studied in an international conference convened for that purpose, or in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, or directly by the States. In other words, the international community

(Mr. Christov, Bulgaria)

is fully aware that the solution of the problem of the prohibition of nuclear weapons poses objectively no insurmountable obstacle, can be found quickly, and depends only on an act of political good will by the States which are opposed to it.

68. An attempt is made to justify the absence of this element which is necessary to the solution of the problem by various theories based on the concept of the balance of terror and of deterrent power, in which the threat of possible recourse to nuclear weapons plays the decisive part. But reality shows clearly how negative and also how dangerous this concept is. It is presented as the only guarantee of peace, but has several times led the world to the brink of catastrophe. It is presented as a sure means of avoiding armed conflict with conventional weapons, but has not prevented certain wars in South-East Asia and the Middle East. On the contrary, those conflicts have been organized, perpetrated, provoked and carried out under cover of this notorious theory of balance, with all its attendant risks.

69. We cannot see the justification of some assertions that a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear arms would contain only unqualified obligations -- in other words, obligations not supported by effective guarantees involving certain forms of control or sanctions. It is forgotten that in the case with which we are dealing the best guarantee would be the vital interest of all countries to free themselves, through a reciprocal and solemn commitment, from the nuclear threat. To refuse to conclude an international agreement on the pretext that that agreement would not be respected would be tantamount to denying that the documents and instruments of international law which are the very fabric of the history of human society have any value at all.

70. The essential content of international agreements lies, it seems to us, in the expression of a political will, which in this case would be to condemn and prohibit the use of nuclear weapons that can harm human beings without discrimination and destroy the environment in which they live. The aim pursued by such an agreement is obviously to set up a barrier against the use of weapons and means of destruction particularly dangerous to humanity and civilization, so as to contain the danger until States can take and implement technical decisions such as a production cut-off, the liquidation of stockpiles and other disarmament measures, leading finally to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

(Mr. Christov, Bulgaria)

71. For all those reasons the Bulgarian delegation declares itself once again in favour of the conclusion of an international convention for the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, and considers that the Eighteen-Nation Committee must start to discuss this subject immediately.

72. Mr. ZELLEKE (Ethiopia): As has already been said, this Committee, as a body which made a major contribution to the achievement of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (ENDC/226*), may well congratulate itself upon that achievement. The prime requisite -- namely the widest possible adherence, which a treaty of this nature demands in order to be an effective international instrument -- is now almost assured by the large number of States which have already signed the treaty and by the prospect that even more States are favourably disposed to sign it. It is only to be hoped that an auspicious world climate may soon be achieved that will enable other nations, including the two nuclear-weapon Powers and the remaining few near-nuclear Powers, to join the large majority of nations in giving effect to the treaty on non-proliferation upon which so many hopes of peace and security and co-operation are centred.

73. While we, however, take a cautious view of our past efforts and achievements, it must be remembered that the viability as a going concern of the finalized treaty has been made largely dependent upon a ceaseless endeavour to search for and agree upon other measures of nuclear disarmament as well as to foster international co-operation to tame nuclear energy to serve the peaceful needs of man. No one is more aware of that fact than this Committee; and that is why this session of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, which was reconvened soon after the adoption of the treaty, should take as its point of departure the provisions of the treaty that give rise to immediate obligations for further agreements on other areas of nuclear disarmament. Obviously, I am referring to article VI and the group of preambular paragraphs which are too well known to be repeated here.

74. It may be too early to predict the outcome of the first review conference five years after the entry into force of the treaty, as stipulated in article VIII, paragraph 3. Nevertheless, past experience of the time-consuming nature of disarmament negotiations does not allow of a leisurely procedure for the Committee. In that connexion my delegation wishes to join other delegations which have already welcomed the understanding reached between the United States and the Soviet Union to negotiate on a bilateral basis on the restriction of the offensive and defensive nuclear-missile systems. As we wish them speedy success, my delegation would like at the same time to endorse the view that this Committee would more than welcome a report from time to time from the two delegations on the progress of work on this important undertaking.

(Mr. Zelleke, Ethiopia)

75. Here in the Committee we have one agenda and one priority -- that is, disarmament, general and complete, nuclear and non-nuclear. It is needless to argue now about the profoundly-complicated political intricacies that too early forced disarmament negotiators to concentrate attention on the alternative course of proceeding step by step to clear the ground for this ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament -- hence the collateral measures.

76. Throughout the years the General Assembly in its various resolutions has incessantly urged this Committee to give urgent consideration to these well-known measures of disarmament. In addition, at the beginning of this session our co-Chairmen, with their usual initiative, highlighted for us some of the outstanding issues that the Committee might take up for fruitful discussion. We are particularly indebted in this regard to the memorandum (ENDC/227) which the Soviet Union submitted to the General Assembly on 1 July and which lists a number of topical issues according to a certain order of priorities.

77. If we appear to be hesitant about proceeding with our task of making known our considered views on these various disarmament measures, it is not because we underrate the importance of any of those issues to the cause of disarmament. On the contrary, we hold the view that no measure of disarmament is really small; and that is why we find the choosing of one or two priority items from among the numerous collateral measures proposed to us to be as difficult as dealing with all of them together. Nevertheless, a month has already passed since the Committee resumed its session on 16 July and it is still lingering indecisively on the numerous topics before it. Several delegations have made known their choice of priority with a force of argument and clarity that are no doubt admirable, and my delegation is studying their statements carefully.

78. For the Ethiopian delegation the choice of priority items is quite obvious. That choice has not been made now. It was made as far back as nine years ago, when the Ethiopian Government, after thoughtful consideration of the great dangers of self-annihilation that overshadowed humanity as a result of the continued accumulation and sophistication of nuclear weapons, took the initiative in submitting a proposal for the total prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons for war purposes. Our proposal, as is well known, was adopted by the

(Mr. Zelleke, Ethiopia)

sixteenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations as resolution 1653 (XVI), which declared the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons to be contrary to the United Nations Charter and a crime against humanity. Since then every passing year that has brought news of further accumulation and sophistication of the destructive capacity of those weapons has only strengthened our conviction in regard to our proposal to ban the use of nuclear weapons.

79. No one has succeeded so far in giving an exact assessment of the possible destruction that would befall the world should a total nuclear war be unleashed; but numerous studies of nuclear bombs of a given capacity or of a given megaton yield make it a foregone conclusion that no man would survive to tell of the great sufferings and agonies of death that would be the fate of all humanity. The chapter of United Nations document A/6858 on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons brings out clearly the destructive capacity of those weapons. The conclusion drawn from the findings on that aspect of nuclear weapons is worth repeating now. That part of the study concluded with the following paragraph:

"The basic facts about the nuclear bomb and its use are harsh and terrifying for civilization; they have become lost in a mass of theoretical verbiage. It has been claimed that the world has learnt to live with the bomb; it is also said there is no need for it to drift unnecessarily into the position that it is prepared to die for it. The ultimate question for the world to decide in our nuclear age --- and this applies both to nuclear and non-nuclear Powers --- is what short-term interests it is prepared to sacrifice in exchange for an assurance of survival and security." (ibid., para.42)

80. No doubt nuclear-weapon countries are even more aware of the dangers of those lethal weapons, and the highest degree of restraint will be exercised about using them. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that history has time and again proved to the world that a build-up of armaments has always tended to create uncontrollable circumstances.

81. It has been argued many times in several quarters, and repeated here in our Committee, that no international convention to outlaw the use of nuclear weapons would in effect be binding upon belligerent nations. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 to outlaw the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons and the restraining effect it had on the warring nations throughout the Second World War, as clearly pointed out by Mr. Roshchin, leader of the Soviet delegation, in his statement to this Committee at our meeting of 1 August (ENDC/PV.386, para.49), no doubt constitute an adequate

reply. Concerning the argument to the contrary, I wish only to add that if the restraining effect of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 on one side can be doubted, its restraining effect on the other side cannot be denied; and that is what has saved the world from all-out chemical warfare.

82. In insisting upon an international conference for the purpose of signing a convention to outlaw the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons as a matter of urgency, we are further motivated by the clear advantage that in our view such a convention would entail for international peace and security, which are so indispensable to effective negotiations in other areas of disarmament measures. We are encouraged by the growing support and stronger demand from the nations of the world for the urgent convening of an international conference for the purpose of signing a convention to ban the use of nuclear weapons, as evidenced by a number of United Nations resolutions adopted at successive sessions of the General Assembly. I wish in this connexion to take note of the very important statements on this very important subject made today by the representatives of Poland, the United Arab Republic and Bulgaria. I also wish to welcome in this connexion the initiative of the Soviet Union, which has already submitted a draft convention, on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons (A/6834, pp.3, 4). The Ethiopian Government is studying that draft convention with the utmost care and will express its views in detail in due course.

83. As I have said, if the Ethiopian delegation insists now, as always, on the conclusion as a matter of urgency of an international convention to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, it is not only because we believe that no effort should be spared to save mankind from the dangers of nuclear destruction, but also because we believe in the salutary effect of such a convention on our endeavours to achieve real measures of disarmament by which nuclear weapons and their means of delivery would be reduced and eventually eliminated.

84. That leads me to the other issues with which this Committee is asked to deal. There is no doubt that in this respect the comprehensive test-ban treaty should come next in the list of priority items. It is an unfinished task which can no longer be postponed. Five years have passed since the signing of the partial test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1), and the promise to extend it to the prohibition of underground testing still remains unfulfilled. The General Assembly has by numerous resolutions continually urged this Committee to give consideration to this problem as a matter of urgency. The main impediment to the solution of this problem, the question of

(Mr. Zelleke, Ethiopia)

verification, is no longer an insurmountable problem. The amount of research which has been carried out on the perfecting of national means of verification and identification has certainly reduced the political risks to the very minimum.

85. The statement of the Swedish representative at our 385th meeting, the document submitted by her delegation on the results obtained by a group of seismological experts (ENDC/230), and the statements made by the representative of the United Kingdom at our 381st meeting and the representative of Canada at our 389th meeting are worthy of our attention. My delegation, for one, will give them serious attention and make its views on them known when the subject is taken up by the Committee with a view to arriving at an agreed text on this important problem.

86. It follows from this that nuclear-weapon countries would have no reason to continue production of nuclear weapons, not only because they possess sufficient nuclear weapons to destroy the world, as has been pointed out in this Committee several times, but also because disarmament measures of the nature I have mentioned will make it impossible for them to continue perfecting these weapons. The question of the cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapon purposes would thus become a logical next step. It has been stated in this Committee by other delegations, including the Indian delegation in its statement on 13 August (ENDC/PV.389, para.10), that the control arrangements adopted for the non-proliferation treaty could be made to serve as a basis for verification of the cut-off agreement. This, in our opinion, should be given careful consideration.

87. As regards the other measures of disarmament which are not directly connected with nuclear disarmament: namely, the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons and the peaceful uses of the sea-bed and ocean floor, the Ethiopian delegation finds itself in complete agreement with the statement made by the representative of Mexico on 13 August (*ibid.*, para. 46) that these measures could be dealt with simultaneously with other nuclear disarmament measures. We have noted carefully the interest aroused in this Committee in finding solutions of these problems. The Ethiopian delegation will study the various proposals and methods of work proposed by the United Kingdom delegation and others. For the moment, I wish only to add my delegation's support of the request for a study by the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the nature and possible effects of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

88. Finally, at a time when man's creativity threatens to fail to meet the requirements of his own expansion in at least two-thirds of the world, no disarmament talk would be complete if it did not note the great promises of progress in nuclear technology which are at present disguised in the building-up of armaments. The search for peace and security through disarmament can no longer be treated in isolation from the growing menace of poverty that is equally beginning to be a threat to peace and security. Every measure of disarmament must therefore contain promise of releasing human and material resources as well as of promoting co-operation in the peaceful application of nuclear energy. In this respect articles IV and V of the non-proliferation treaty must be emphasized. The Ethiopian delegation feels that international co-operation in the peaceful application of nuclear energy and nuclear explosives can best be served through the existing organization of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Our experiences in other fields of international co-operation make us cautious about the proliferation of organizations.

89. Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): We have listened this morning with great interest to the very comprehensive statements of the representatives of Poland, the United Arab Republic, Bulgaria and Ethiopia. Those statements dealt with very important problems of disarmament, and we are pleased to note that considerable attention was devoted to questions put forward in the Soviet memorandum of 1 July (ENDC/227), such as the banning of nuclear weapons, the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests including underground tests, the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons, and so on. Those statements are undoubtedly an important contribution to the consideration by the Committee of the problems of disarmament. The considerations expressed in them will be carefully studied by us and appropriate conclusions will be drawn from them.

90. In my present statement I should like to touch upon one of the questions raised in today's speeches by a number of representatives, in particular the representatives of the United Arab Republic, Bulgaria and Ethiopia.

91. We are pleased to note that during the current session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee many representatives have devoted considerable attention to the question of banning chemical and bacteriological weapons. The position of the Soviet Union on this question is stated, as all the members of the Committee know, in the Soviet memorandum on disarmament of 1 July. At the last meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee the Soviet delegation dwelt on this problem in detail (ENDC/PV.389, paras.64 et seq.).

At the meeting of the Committee held on 30 July the representative of Poland, Mr. Jaroszek, introduced a proposal concerning the preparation of a report on the consequences of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological methods of warfare (ENDC/PV.385, para.70). In their statements today the representatives of the United Arab Republic, Bulgaria and Ethiopia also have made known their views on this question. They have expressed their favourable attitude towards the proposal of the delegation of Poland.

92. For our part, we too have carefully studied this very useful proposal by the Polish delegation, and we wish to state that the Soviet Union supports the idea advanced by the delegation of the Polish People's Republic concerning the preparation of a report on the consequences of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. We consider that, like last year's report concerning the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons (A/6858), a report on the consequences of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological weapons should be prepared by a group of experts appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. In our opinion this report, when prepared, should be transmitted to the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. The Soviet delegation expresses the hope that other members of our Committee will also take a favourable attitude towards the proposal concerning the preparation of a report on the consequences of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological weapons and will support the very useful, timely and important proposal made in our Committee by the representative of Poland, Mr. Jaroszek.

93. The CHAIRMAN (United Arab Republic): As there are no other speakers on my list, I shall now read the text of a statement regarding our provisional agenda which has been presented by our co-Chairmen:

"AGENDA

"The co-Chairmen have been giving consideration to the agenda and procedure of work for the Committee. They are aware that the members of the Committee wish to establish an agenda. They have taken note of the very large number of measures and proposals which members of the Committee have put forward for discussion by the Committee.

(The Chairman, United Arab Republic)

"In recognition of the views expressed by the members of the Committee, in response to the recommendations of the General Assembly, taking into account the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and also the agreement announced on 1 July 1968 for bilateral discussions on the limitation and reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles, the co-Chairmen suggest the following provisional agenda:

"1. Further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.

"Under this heading members may wish to discuss measures dealing with the cessation of testing, the non-use of nuclear weapons, the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons use, the cessation of manufacture of weapons and reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear stockpiles, nuclear-free zones, etc.

"2. Non-nuclear measures.

"Under this heading, members may wish to discuss chemical and bacteriological warfare, regional arms limitations, etc.

"3. Other collateral measures.

"Under this heading, members may wish to discuss prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, etc.

"4. General and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

"The co-Chairmen note the recognized right of any delegation to raise and discuss any disarmament subject in any meeting of the Committee."

94. That is the full text of the proposed agenda. Does any representative wish to comment on this?

95. Mr. BUNN (United States of America): I want to say just a word or two about the agenda. It represents a compromise between differing points of view. Many measures have been listed by different delegations for consideration. At the same time, many delegations have asked that the Committee focus its attention on one, two, or three measures. No agreement exists within this Committee on the single measure.

(Mr. Bunn, United States)

which should come next. Yet all appear to agree that measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament should have first priority -- indeed that point of view was repeated this morning by the representative of Poland and by you, Mr. Chairman, in your capacity as representative of the United Arab Republic. This agenda establishes such a priority. Because there is no agreement on what specific measures within this nuclear category should come next, the agenda does not attempt to establish specific priorities for specific measures within the nuclear category.

96. High on any agenda, of course, must come the question of the cessation of the strategic offensive and defensive missile race. As a matter of fact, my Government believes that this is the most significant of any measure in the nuclear category. Progress in limiting strategic delivery systems will facilitate the achievement of various related measures of nuclear arms control and disarmament. Many of these measures are listed in the first category. We believe that this Committee can lay the foundation for those other measures, attempting to bring agreement closer, where that is possible, while the bilateral missile talks are going forward. We need a continued exchange of views in the Committee to explore the complexities of these various measures in order to establish a sound basis for progress on the most promising one. I believe that this was the point which you made this morning as representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Chairman.

97. My own hope is that one or more of these measures will become ripe for agreement during the future work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament; and as the missile talks progress we intend to continue our efforts to narrow the differences on these other measures in order to achieve agreement on one or more of them at the earliest possible date.

98. Let me repeat our view -- and I think it is also the view of other members of the Committee -- that effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament are of first priority.

99. Mr. BURNS (Canada): The Canadian delegation welcomes the agenda which has been placed before us by the co-Chairmen, and is particularly glad to hear the statement of the representative of the United States that a clear priority should be given to the group of measures covered by the first heading: "Further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

nuclear disarmament." We believe that the view that these measures should have priority is held by many other delegations which have spoken. The views which you yourself, Mr. Chairman, expressed today, and those expressed at our last meeting by the representatives of India (ENDC/PV.389, para.10) and Mexico (*ibid.*, para.51) and at previous meetings by the representative of Sweden (ENDC/PV.383, 385) are in accordance, I believe, with the statement made today by the representative of the United States; and I take it that the same view is held by the other co-Chairman, the representative of the Soviet Union.

100. The Canadian delegation hopes that in our report to the twenty-third session of the General Assembly the question of giving particular priority to this group of measures will be made quite plain, because we feel that those Members of the United Nations which are not members of this Committee will wish to receive a clear statement to this effect responding to the requests contained in the various General Assembly resolutions and to the obligations under article VI of the non-proliferation treaty (ENDC/226).

101. Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): In preparing the provisional agenda which has now been submitted for the consideration of the Committee, the co-Chairmen — including the co-Chairman from the Soviet Union — have fully taken into account the wishes and considerations put forward here by members of the Committee. We fully agree with the principle that nuclear disarmament should be given definite priority. That has been stated by many delegations at meetings of the Committee, and has been stated again today by the representatives of the United Arab Republic and Ethiopia.

102. In this connexion we would point out that in the memorandum of the Soviet Union (ENDC/227), of the ten proposals put forward concerning disarmament the five which deal with nuclear disarmament are mentioned first of all. Thereby due regard is given to that very important aspect of the problem of disarmament which it has assumed since the emergence of such destructive types of weaponry as nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.

103. Therefore it appears to us that the considerations put forward by the representative of Canada and the statement made by the representative of the United States concerning the agenda are fully in accord with the views expressed by practically all members of the Committee in the course of the discussions on the problem of disarmament, not only at the present session but also at previous sessions of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee.

104. Mr. HUSAIN (India): At the outset let me say that my delegation greatly welcomes the statement of the co-Chairmen about the proposed agenda and timetable of work. As members are aware, there has been a growing feeling in the Committee over the past month that something of this nature should emerge from the co-Chairmen soon; and we are happy that this has occurred. This is a definite step forward which will help the Committee to proceed with its work.

105. As to the details of the proposal, I note that under four main headings a very large number of items have been listed -- in fact, most of the items which have been suggested at some stage or other during the past month. We are happy that all those items have been included in the proposed agenda. But, as has been pointed out by the representative of the United States, the inter se priority under each heading is not indicated. We are happy to hear, however -- and in this I share the view of Mr. Burns -- that it is hoped that before long the inter se priority of the items listed under each of the four broad headings will be indicated. I should like to express the hope that this will be done at a very early date, otherwise our discussions, as I have had occasion to mention before, will continue to be discursive and to roam over a vast field and will not concentrate on making definite, positive, concrete progress on specific issues.

106. As to the four broad headings, I should like to support what has already been said by the representative of Canada, the representatives of the United States and the representative of the Soviet Union: that among those four headings the item of first priority is item 1 as listed in the statement of the co-Chairmen, namely the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. I would recall what I said in my intervention the other day:

"... the delegation of India would like to stress that our Committee should concern itself as a matter of the highest priority with negotiations on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Negotiations on those measures alone -- rather than on measures of non-armament -- would carry conviction with the peoples of the world, both in regard to the repeatedly expressed intentions of the great Powers and in regard to the seriousness of the work of this Committee."

(ENDC/PV.389, para.21)

That point of view has been expressed in various shapes and forms by most of my colleagues. Therefore we would support the idea that as a matter of first priority we should take up items under main heading No.1. But I should like to repeat that we shall make no progress unless some inter se priority is indicated among that long list of items.

107. I myself feel it would probably be helpful if the co-Chairmen, in informal discussions with the other members of the Committee, tried to determine what the inter se priorities should be and, perhaps before the conclusion of this session, indicate which of the items under the main heading we might take up as items 1, 2 or 3, and so forth. We would leave that to the co-Chairmen to decide.

108. Regarding the other three main headings, I would comment only on numbers 2 and 3: non-nuclear measures, and other collateral measures. I should like to submit for the consideration of my colleagues that the heading "Other collateral measures" is all-embracing and really includes heading 2, that is, non-nuclear measures. In fact all the items listed under headings 1, 2 and 3 are collateral measures; but for the reason mentioned earlier -- in order to indicate the degree of importance we attach to nuclear disarmament -- it is right and proper that heading 1 should stand as it is. It would be helpful perhaps if under "Other collateral measures" we could also have the item mentioned under heading 2. "Other collateral measures" could indicate the set of measures which are non-nuclear measures and the others which are mixed, like the question of the sea-bed which involves both nuclear and non-nuclear aspects of the problem. I submit this for consideration. I am not, however, making a formal proposal.

109. There is one other matter I should like to raise, and that is: what are we to do about the five General Assembly resolutions on which we have to report to the next session of the General Assembly? I agree, of course, that the subject-matter of those five resolutions is covered in the items suggested by the co-Chairmen. But we should like to hear what the co-Chairmen suggest we might do about those resolutions.

110. Those are my comments at this stage, and I would be glad to hear the views of the other members of the Committee.

111. Mr. BUNN (United States of America): I should like to reply briefly to the suggestion made by the representative of India.

(Mr. Bunn, United States)

112. In our discussion we found it necessary to have the three categories -- 1, 2 and 3 -- which members see on the proposed agenda. The first category is clearly a nuclear category; and if there were then simply an "Other" category, as the representative of India has suggested, the implication would clearly be that that was non-nuclear. We believe that the sea-bed measure is not such a measure. There are differences of view on that measure within the Committee; so we felt that the best way of dealing with it was to put it in the category in which it appears. I do not think anybody contends that it is a non-nuclear measure. But if there were one category which was clearly nuclear and a second category which was simply called "Other collateral measures", the implication would clearly be that the sea-bed question was non-nuclear. The co-Chairmen resolved the difference of view in a compromise, which appears before the Committee, in which the sea-bed measure is under neither the first heading nor the second heading but is under a third heading -- "Other collateral measures". There may well be other measures of that kind which other delegations will suggest.

113. I agree with the representative of India that the agenda is broad enough to take care of the subject-matter of the five General Assembly resolutions. They will be dealt with in the final report in the manner in which they are usually dealt with. We have not yet drafted the final report, but I do not believe there will be any great difficulty with it. The final report will be submitted to the Committee in due course in draft form, and members will then have an opportunity of commenting and making suggestions if they believe we have not dealt adequately with one or another of the General Assembly resolutions.

114. Mr. HUSAIN (India); I am very grateful to the representative of the United States for clarifying some of the points I raised. I do appreciate the need to make some distinction between the two categories. I also agree with him that it would not be appropriate to give the impression that a measure such as that concerning the sea-bed is non-nuclear -- because it is not. At the same time it is not clear to me why the non-nuclear measures could not also be brought under the heading of "Other collateral measures", with a sub-heading "Non-nuclear measures".

115. The reason why I venture to repeat this is that I think we should ensure that the non-nuclear measures, simply because they are listed separately, should not be taken by the world outside to have a degree of importance relative to heading 1 which they do not have. I should like to avoid giving that impression. I am sure that all my colleagues here are quite clear about it: that we should avoid giving the

(Mr. Bunn, United States)

116. I am grateful also for the clarification regarding the five General Assembly resolutions. The only further point I should like to make is this: is it at all possible to give some degree of inter se priority to the five General Assembly resolutions, for dealing with them or for having further discussion on them either now or after the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, so that some kind of progress --not much, but some -- could be achieved, to give a more satisfactory impression to the twenty-third session of the General Assembly?

117. Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I must point out that the explanation given by the representative of the United States concerning the singling-out of a special third category in our agenda appears to be quite convincing; and I should like to observe that by singling-out this third category of questions on the provisional agenda the Committee will perhaps be spared -- or has already been spared -- a lengthy discussion on the category to which the question of disarmament, or rather non-armament, of the sea-bed should be assigned. In order to avoid futile waste of time which we could more successfully devote to consideration of the substance of disarmament questions, the question of non-armament of the sea-bed was relegated to a third category in the Committee's agenda.

118. As to the question of when we shall be able to discuss all the questions referred to the Committee by the resolutions of the General Assembly: my delegation considers that we are already discussing all those questions at meetings of the Committee. The representative of India has given us a timely reminder that there are five such resolutions, dealing with general and complete disarmament, prohibition of underground tests, prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons, the elimination of foreign military bases on the territories of other States, in the first instance in Africa, Asia and Latin America, and prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. All of those items are to be discussed at present.

119. We must point out, of course, that the brevity of this session -- and this is something which we have to contend with: we have had only six weeks before the opening of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States -- makes it impossible for us to consider each of those problems individually with due care. I think that that should be appropriately reflected in the report which we shall be presenting. That does not mean that consideration of those problems will be concluded at the present session. At the session which will follow the present one -- and when it will take place it is difficult to say at present -- and at subsequent sessions we shall, likewise,

I presume, discuss thoroughly and carefully the questions included in the agenda and also those resolutions which have been referred to our Committee by the General Assembly, and those which the General Assembly may adopt at its twenty-third session. 120. All this, it seems to me, should be appropriately reflected in the report we are to submit to the General Assembly as a result of the current, unfortunately very brief, session of our Committee, at which, I repeat, it has regrettably been impossible for us to consider all the questions referred to us by the General Assembly as thoroughly and carefully as we should have liked to consider them.

121. The CHAIRMAN (United Arab Republic): Are there any further observations? Since there are none, I declare the agenda adopted by the Committee.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 390th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador H. Khallaf, representative of the United Arab Republic.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Poland, the United Arab Republic, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, the Soviet Union, the United States, Canada and India.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 20 August 1968, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.

